Tuesday 23 May 2017

CHAPTER 8 THE PARACHUTE HOW IT WORKS AND OTHER TRIALS


After UDI, but before things began to heat up, we had little to do, and as the saying goes, the devil makes work for idle hands. This definitely applied to the PJIs. Someone found a photograph of a French parachute taken from directly underneath the inflated canopy. It said this parachute would go up with 80kgs if towed behind a vehicle at 10kms per hr. We studied the photograph carefully then took one of our parachutes normally used for ground training and duplicated all the numerous holes as shown.

The next trick was to borrow a Land Rover from the MT section, get hold of a volunteer and a long rope, and try it out. As it was he who had discovered the photo, Bill Maitland, the School Warrant Officer claimed first go. We asked Salisbury Tower for use of the 32 Runway to carry out an experiment with a parachute that went up instead of down. They were intrigued and so was every airman at New Sarum. Soon the 32 Runway was lined with spectators keen to check out what the loonies at PTS were up to now.

 Bill got into the harness; Trevor Smith got into the Land Rover and inched forward to take up all the slack in the rope; the rest of us held up the canopy and on the word from our leader, Boet Swart, Trevor gunned it.  Bill started to run. His steps got bigger. And bigger. And Bigger. He looked like an uncoordinated ostrich. And like the ostrich, he did not go up one inch. It was like watching a cartoon, hilarious, but a complete failure.

It was not until a few years later we discovered the parachute used in the photograph, was the French version of the Para Commander which is now used at various venues around the world to drag tourists into the air behind a speed boat. What the photograph we had did not show was that the apex of the canopy had been pulled down and moved forward. This then formed an aerodynamic shape which created lift. We only found this out when we obtained some Parra Commander parachutes at a later stage, by which time we were far too busy to play around.

But even at this time it was not all fun and games. We were, in fact, trialling, modifying, and eventually choosing parachutes to suit our conditions. After the breakup of the Federation we needed to build the SAS to full strength, and did a fair number of parachute jumps during recruiting drives. Everything continued as before. We’d been taught by the RAF, were equipped with British equipment, and, as far as training was concerned, nothing was going to change. We were expected to just behave ourselves, and keep doing it the way it had always been done. Don’t rock the boat was the rumbling from the Air Staff. But, being silly colonialists, and devil may care PJI’s the first thing we did was start playing with the gear the British had given us.

At first we were supplied with the British X type parachute which was developed during WWII, and had not been modified at all. It had a flat canopy made of a nylon fabric (not silk) which, when laid out flat, measured 28ft (8.5mt) in diameter. Each of the 28 gores was divided into 5 panels with a vent in the middle of the circle measuring 22inches (55cm) in diameter.

There were 14 rigging lines attaching the harness to the canopy, but as each line went completely over the top of the canopy, there were 28 lines in all, each with a breaking strain of 500lbs(200kg). The harness was made of 4 thicknesses of flax webbing, each with a breaking strain of 3000lbs(1350kg). All the seams were stitched 2 or 4 times, and were extremely strong.  It’s safe to say the harness was almost unbreakable. All the metal fittings, such as the quick release box, adjusting buckles, and ‘D’ rings for the reserve parachute, and suspended loads, had breaking strains in excess of 5000lbs(2300kg). In other words, it was very bloody strong.

The main problem with the X type parachute was its tendency to oscillate which could cause high speed encounters with the ground. The reason for this oscillation was the build-up of pressure inside the canopy which tended to tilt it, allowing some of the air to escape. The parachutist would swing under this tilting canopy until gravity overcame the force of the escaping air. This pendulum effect was dangerous, especially if contact with the ground was made on the downward swing.

So, an experiment was done to an X type parachute which had been damaged and was going to be written off. We made the damage worse. We cut out two gores, five gores apart, then positioned these holes at the rear when the canopy was fully deployed. We also added two pieces of rigging line stitched to the outer edge of the holes with a piece of wood at the bottom end to form a toggle. This was fitted to the front lift webs with a small piece of tape sewn to form a loop through which the rigging line passed just below the rigging line attachments We figured by pulling on a toggle it would distort the hole in the canopy and make it  rotate in that direction
  

This photograph shows a 28ft dia X type parachute canopy with a seven gore T.U. modification. The sleeve in which the canopy is packed with the pilot chute can be seen as  a shadow on the outside of the canopy. A seven Gore T.U. was the maximum modification we ever tried and even this was stretching our luck a little. The maximum we ever used on HALO operations with a 35ft dia SAVIAC, was a double blank 5 gore separation which worked well especially on dark nights.





All we had to do was convince the safety equipment workers that this would work, persuade them to do the modifications and pack the thing so we could try it out on a dummy. The Safety Equipment Section nearly had a fit. It was sacrilege. It was idiocy. Cut up a parachute and still expect it to work? Ridiculous. But we prevailed. The dummy drop worked and I jumped it the next day.

It was an absolute joy. By pulling down on a toggle the parachute turned in that direction and, in still air, it moved forward at about 5 mph (8kmph). But best of all it was absolutely stable with no oscillation. In fact, because it was such a stable parachute, it had a slower rate of descent, about 19 feet per second as against 22feet per second for a full canopy. Serious thought was given to modifying all of our X types but we were told we’d be re-equipped with modern parachutes in the near future and to stop modifications before we did something really silly.

In 1964, after the breakup of the Federation, the staff at PTS were given a number of different static line military parachutes to trial. One, called the PX, was of British design it was basically a 32ft copy of the 28ft, ordinary X type. It still had a tendency to oscillate and the rate of descent was much the same - we decided we preferred the old X type. It would have been improved if a couple of gores had been removed as per our modification.

The PX also had a skirt made of some type of netting fitted around the periphery of the canopy. This was supposed to reduce chances of blown periphery malfunctions caused by the higher dropping speed of more modern aircraft. This was not a problem for us as we still had the good-old Dakotas. Beside this, the PX was still fitted with the antiquated harness which still needed to be adapted to the individual, the canopy could not be jettisoned, and there was still no way to strap a weapon to the soldier for ready access on landing.



This is a very rare photograph of a 28ft dia X type parachute with a blown periphery malfunction which has reduced the drag area of the canopy dramatically. This SAS paratrooper has pulled his reserve parachute rip cord, carried out the correct drills and is about to land with his feet tight together. This jump took place in about 1966 on our training DZ runway 32 Salisbury Airport and the soldier concerned was Sgt Jock Hutton ex British Parachute Regiment and ‘D’ Day veteran.

In February 1967 we obtained a few French parachutes called the TAP 665.We got them via sources in Mozambique for trial purposes. This parachute also had little to offer over the X type. It did not have a significantly slower rate of descent and its manufacture and harness design had no improvements.

In April 1967 we received a very strange static line parachute. It was basically made up of three parachute canopies sewn together to form a triangle. It was obtained from an Eastern Block source, and was possibly of Russian design. We were willing to give most things a go but in this instance decided to draw the line at jumping this contraption. I don’t know what became of this piece of parachuting history, it just disappeared.

In July 1967 the Parachute Training School finally got hold of a number of PT 10 American parachutes. These were a huge improvement on all the static line military parachutes we’d tried up to this time. Its shaped canopy eliminated the oscillations and its increased size (35ft in diameter) slowed the rate of descent from
22ft per sec to about 16ft per sec. In addition this parachute was fitted with the Capewell canopy release system enabling the parachutist to jettison his canopy after landing. Other improvements included a body band on the harness which allowed the parachutist to carry his weapon strapped to his side instead of on 15ft of rope. This, as far as the staff at PTS was concerned, was the greatest improvement to military parachuting since the 1940s as the soldier had his weapon at hand immediately on landing.

There was another improvement to the PT10 parachute which we gleaned from a film which showed American paratroops in training.  In this, we noticed the troops hooked their static lines to the overhead cable in the Dakota as opposed to the British method of side cable and strop. Of course we had to try it out, first with a dummy, which worked, and then with the PJIs, which was again successful. We were able to greatly improve the aircraft drill with this method. There was absolutely no doubt in our minds the PT10 was the parachute for us.

The only drawback was the fragile nature of the Rip Stop nylon used in the canopy construction of the PT10. It was far easier to damage during tree landings. In the American context this parachute would have been discarded on operational jumps, but we did not have this wasteful option. Still, this was the parachute we were determined to have.

Due to sanctions we could not purchase the original, but eventually obtained a South African made copy called the SAVIAC. We ordered them from a company called P.I.S.A.( Parachute Industries South Africa) which was a  part of the Republic Of South Africa Government Arms Corp. Luckily for us, the SAVIAC  canopy was made of a much more robust nylon material and was not easily torn when tree landings occurred. We also had a number of these parachutes modified to TU status and they worked well in the HALO (High Altitude Low Opening) context at a later stage.





The above photograph shows a Royal Australian Air Force D.H.C.4 Caribou, an aircraft which was an absolute pleasure to parachute from and may have enabled the PJI's of the Rhodesian Air Force to do many more silly experiments.


The occasional aircraft was also trialled. In June 1964 we had the pleasure of jumping out of a Caribou aircraft ,which, in our opinion, would have been a great addition to our parachuting aircraft. It had excellent short take off and landing capability (S.T.O.L.) and a rear ramp which enabled us to parachute big items. However this pipe dream was not going to happen and we had to make the most of our Dakotas.

Although we never really stopped experimenting or looking for new and better ways to do things, once the SAVIAC was chosen and supply organised we were ready for the next step in the saga of the Parachute Training School.

Tuesday 16 May 2017

CHAPTER 7 THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

  
On November 11 1965, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith made the now famous Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Suddenly, the Parachute Training School hangar was filled with soldiers, armed with all manner of weapons, including Saracen Armoured Cars, rocket launchers, mortars, and even some Vickers machine guns. Some thought the British might smite this bunch of rowdy up-start rebels. Nothing happened, and, after a short period of excitement, things returned to normal. I remember, the Saracen Armoured Cars were armed with a 37mm main gun, but we only had 3 rounds of ammunition for them. I went for a hair raising ride in one of these cars which drove at speed straight into a fair sized Masasa  tree. This resulted in having a lot of branches wrapped around the front of the car and the young Subaltern yelling over the roar of the engine "See, Instant camouflage". As far as I was concerned they were crazy.

In December 1965 we trained SAS basic course #19, and the PJIs managed to prevent their training skills from becoming stale. However, something new was starting to happen. Along with the political changes, systems and attitudes within the Armed Forces changed too. We finally began to break free from the restraints imposed upon us by the British system and started to develop our own techniques and to challenge the assumptions we’d inherited from the old RAF system.

 It was during this time that a great portion of the RAF Parachuting Manual was thrown in the bin. One of the problems of the British system was the Airforce trained the Army to parachute but they were unaware of, and failed to assess, the soldiers' needs after landing. For example, where was his weapon? Was it easy to collapse his parachute canopy if there was a ground wind? How hard was it to get down from a tree if he landed up one? How hard was it to collect all the parachutists together after the parachute descent especially at night?

These were just some of the problems which were addressed by the Royal Rhodesian Air Force Parachute  Training School. None of which had been discussed by the Royal Air Force Parachute Training School when we did our PJI training at Abingdon. The reason for this was because the RAF PJI's were not trained as soldiers. They only thought as airmen. As long as the soldiers arrived on the correct drop zone in one piece the Air Force job was done.

But amongst the Rhodesian PJIs, some of us were airmen, some were soldiers, and Trevor Smith had been a British South Africa Policeman who had been taught how to ride and look after horses. Bill Maitland was an Aircraft  woodworker who had served with the British Parachute Regiment in Palestine and Frank Hales had served with the Royal Artillery in Korea and the SAS in Borneo. This gave our small staff a very wide range of experience - we could, and did think like soldiers,  and brain storming sessions were always entertaining.

For example, up to this point it was a definite no-no to jump into trees. The RAF at Abingdon had told us, repeatedly, it was dangerous, and to be avoided at all costs. Sure, with an X type parachute it could pose a problem if the parachutist was hung up and had to get out of the harness before he could climb down. But the average height of the trees in the Rhodesian bush was only about eight meters or less, and if someone got hooked up he would only end up a meter or so off the ground.

During my childhood, my brothers and I would take great delight in hurtling down the steep driveway on tricycles straight into the bushes at the end. We never sustained any injuries except for a few scratches and in fact, the springy foliage cushioned the fall. On a larger scale, the SAS had jumped into trees in the Malayan jungle – and even had an abseiling device for lowering paratroopers down from very high trees

Up to this time, the only occasions when a parachutist was stuck up a tree had been accidental, and no injury was recorded.  Once I landed on top of one of the pine trees which surrounded the sports fields at New Sarum and the only comment in my log book was “PHEW!!”  It was a problem recovering the parachute, but otherwise no big deal and I was at the very top of the tree clutching the thin bit with the canopy draped around me. I was more concerned with getting down, because the outside of the pine tree looked like a smooth green slide, but not meant for sliding  This happened a few times without any ill effects - apart from retrieving the parachute. Thorn trees could have been painful but I don't recall anybody landing on one.

So it was not the trees that were the problem, but the X type parachute and its antiquated harness. If you were stuck up a tree on the end of this parachute you had no choice but to get out of the harness to climb down. However once we were re-equipped with the SAVIAC copy of the American PT10 Parachute  this was not an issue because these parachutes were fitted with the Capewell canopy release system. This system allowed the parachutist to easily disconnect the parachute canopy from the harness to climb or drop down. Despite what the RAF told us, provided the correct tree landing technique was used there was very little chance of injury.

Another change we made was, we no longer used a DZ (drop-zone) safety officer for trained paratroops on exercises away from home base. A PJI was responsible for the drop, and this could be done from inside the aircraft. DZ’s could easily be selected by careful observation of the area from a helicopter or fixed wing aircraft, or from the Dakota doing the drop. All that was required was  a good look at the ground and the best spot selected. Trees were no longer considered a hazard. In fact, as they offered concealment, they could be used to the paratroopers’ advantage.

Good DZ selection was perfected through on the job training. On one occasion, I jumped onto a ploughed field which looked good from the air, but when I hit the ground I found the clods of earth were large and it was like hitting very hard boulders the size of footballs. The lesson learned was “Do not assume ploughed fields are good DZs” – they are only good if they have been harrowed or it has recently rained a decent amount.

Jumping into a mature maize field was also not a good place to land because the corn in Rhodesia was often over 3mts high and parachute recovery was extra difficult. It was also hard to advance toward the terrorist position and difficult to see the rest of your stick  through the thick corn stalks.
 I learned the hard way another place to avoid was an area the African peasant farmer had cleared for planting. This became evident as I was coming in to land. The farmer had chopped down all the trees he wanted to remove but left a large number of waist high stumps for me to crash into. Something I only discovered when about 10 meters up and coming in to land with nowhere else to go. I can think of only one or two worse sights -  someone under you with a spear pointing up, or having to land astride a barbed wire fence. We found it was often a simple matter of moving a short distance away for the troops to land safely. On most occasions this was less than 100mts.

We also found drifters, (the first paratrooper out who tests wind speed and drift) were not a necessity, and in a combat situation definitely would not be used. With the use of a smoke grenade, or simply observing the trees and grass in the area, a competent person could get a good indication of wind direction and – to a lesser degree – wind speed. Thus the distance to be laid off up wind, could be judged reasonably accurately. The helicopter could give the Dakota crew the necessary information for altimeter setting so an accurate drop height could be guaranteed.

 Until the early 1970's the drop height was still 1000 feet AGL as per RAF rules.  We lowered the drop height to between 400 and 500 ft and this greatly improved accuracy because the paratroops would not drift as far. All Fire Force drops were supposed to be done from 500ft AGL however in the heat of battle this could be lower or higher from time to time.

The only hazard to a successful parachute drop was, and still is, high ground wind speed. As long as the ground wind was below 15 knots, the injury rate was kept to a reasonably low level. We found that if any troops were dropped in winds exceeding 15 knots injuries would be sustained no matter how experienced they were. The ridiculous result: more injuries, and consequently more casualty evacuations, would be caused by parachuting than by the enemy.

Ground training by the PJIs was essential on a continuous basis to keep the injury rate very low. This was borne out later in the Fire-Force role when thousands of jumps took place every year and very low injury rates were maintained. Also, before any troops were ever tasked to carry out a new type of parachute descent, eg into trees, rocky ground, ploughed fields, static line drops from 400ft or HALO drops well above 20,000ft AGL, it was always tried out by the PJIs first. We were the experts and the crash test dummies - if we couldn’t do it, the troops definitely could not.

As we were no longer restricted to the RAF methods, we were happy to take ideas from around the world. For example, we had access to a number of training films one of which was about the American way of training paratroops. It showed  us they used the over head cable in the C47 Dakota for their static line parachute deployment. The RAF way was to use a cable down the starboard side and a 15ft long strop to deploy the parachute. This made the aircraft drill complicated and required greater maintenance because the strops had to be folded in a special way. We inherited this system and because it worked it was not deemed prudent to change it. However, because the Americans used the overhead cable to deploy PT10 parachutes we felt safe in doing it as well. All the staff at PTS jumped with this parachute and we brainstormed various methods to make the aircraft drill simple.



This photograph clearly shows a stick of paratroopers using X Type parachutes whilst jumping from a Dakota aircraft. On the man nearest the door is the strop and hook attached to the static line D ring. This is beginning to pull the parachute pack open. The rigging lines of the middle man in the stick have begun to deploy. The first man in the stick's parachute canopy is starting to inflate. Total time for all three men to jump is less than a second and a half.

Always aware of the soldiers' needs after he landed, we also worked to improve ways to carry rifles and MAG's. One improvement we  did adopt from the RAF was the CSPEP (carrying straps personal equipment parachutist) which was better than the old W.W.2 PWC ( parachute weapons container).






This photograph shows a Rhodesian African Rifles paratrooper  with his MAG (M60 to some) secured to his body with the body band of his parachute. Notice he has a 50 round belt of ammunition wrapped around the breach of the gun. On close inspection the rigging line tie can be seen tied around the trigger guard of the weapon, it would be going under the parachute lift webs and held in place by the reserve parachute on the left side of the harness. A parachute recovery bag can be seen dangling around this soldiers knees it is hanging from a leg strap. The rest of the stick can be seen waiting in the shade under the wing of the Dakota. A close look at the aircraft engine shows the anti Strella exhaust shroud. The Strella was an  anti aircraft heat seeking  missile used by the terrorists. No Dakota's were shot down by them.

We found that with the PT 10 parachute harness, a rifle or the MAG could be carried by the parachutist, secured to his body by the parachute body band. A piece of parachute rigging line was secured to the butt of the weapon and passed under the parachute lift webs, around his back, to the reserve D ring on the opposite side of his body. On landing the parachutist only had to unclip his reserve, pull the body band quick release and his weapon could be used. If necessary he could operate his Capewells and join the battle with the parachute harness still on.

For the Parachute Training School UDI promoted thinking outside of the box. Equipment and supplies were difficult to get due to sanctions, and parachuting information was almost impossible to obtain. But because of this we became innovators, inventors and developers of better military parachuting techniques. 

Wednesday 3 May 2017

CHAPTER #5 THE FIRST OPERATIONAL JUMPS IN THE FEDERATION OP MACKEREL





In September 1962, there were a number of incidents among the local tribesmen in the more remote areas of Southern Rhodesia. In 1961 a new Constitution was negotiated between the Southern Rhodesian and British governments which widened the franchise, allowing black Africans, with a certain level of education and status to vote for the first time. This franchise was originally agreed to by Joshua Nkomo, but he soon changed his mind and demanded “one man one vote.”

This cry spread around the country. Various gangs proceeded to intimidate the local tribal people, burning down the stores, also damaging maize grinding mills
and cattle dipping facilities. There were a number of murders and general civil disobedience started to escalate. This was the beginning of the Nationalist movement, which would later turn into the Rhodesian Bush War, a vicious terrorist war involving the entire population of this small African country.

The first operational parachute drops by the SAS took place at Kutama Mission Makwiro on September 22, 1962. Called Operation Mackerel, it consisted of two sticks of ten troops dropped, from Dakota #704, flown by Flying Officer Stewart. The silly thing about this operation was the day before the drop took place, I was sent, by road, to carry out a DZ (drop zone) reconnaissance in the area.


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My brief was to find a suitable DZ and to “please do it quietly.” At the time I did not give the task much thought. Being young and a little ignorant of the situation, all I had to do was exactly what I’d been taught at RAF Abingdon ie. find a flat piece of ground 1000 metres by 1000 metres, devoid of trees, fences, rocks, or any other obstacles, mark it on a map, and write down the preferred run in direction.

Up to this time, us technical types in the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (I had originally been trained as an instrument fitter) did not have much to do with navigation or, for that matter, soldiering. This idea of plotting things on a map for some "Officer Pilot" in a Dakota to find and then drop paratroops thereupon was daunting. I had a vague idea of how to read a map and take a compass bearing, and I knew the general area as I had been born  in the local Kutama mission hospital, and my family owned a ranch not far away.

I went to see Mrs Pam Broli, the fearsome lady at the MT(Military Transport) Section , and after the usual argument, with much reference to various written orders, was permitted to sign out a Land Rover. I obtained a 1:50,000 map of the area from the New Sarum map room, and called on the stores to sign out a prismatic compass. This was classed as a valuable and attractive item and I almost had to sign my pension over to get one.

Having prized the necessary pieces of equipment out of their various residences, I set off towards Kutama Mission. This was supposed to be a secret mission, but here I was driving into what was supposed to be an area in turmoil, with all sorts of random lawless activity taking place, completely unarmed. It did not take very long to find a suitable DZ close to a village, which appeared to be peaceful. It met all the necessary requirements and I actually walked over the entire piece of open grassland. The few locals who looked in my direction didn’t show any interest in what that silly makewa (white man) was doing, walking up and down all over the place. After plotting the selected DZ on the map and marking the preferred dropping run, I climbed back into the Land Rover and drove back to New Sarum. After returning the precious compass and Land Rover I reported to my C.O. Flt/Lt R.T.D. Smith (Ron had recently been promoted to Flt/Lt), who was the seconded RAF Boss of PTS, and showed him the location on the map.

He told me to go to 3 Squadron pilots, show the pilot who was doing the drop, and then report to Bill Maitland, the acting school Warrant Officer. Bill was detailing the crew to fly on this, the first armed operational parachute drop in the history of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

All the PJIs wanted to be in on this deal; it was the real thing, we were going into action, and we might even be shot at. I was the spare PJI, as the others were training static line course #11 and they would have had to inflict serious injury to exclude me from this.

I found the troops who were to do the jump the next morning, and assisted them in packing their kit. In those days there was a suspended load called a Parachutist Weapons Container (PWC) which involved much lacing of the main pack and fitting .303 rifles into sleeves and securing them to the pack. Having packed the PWCs, we fitted the suspension ropes and suspension hooks. All the parachutes were then collected from Safety Equipment and each man adjusted the harness of his X Type parachute to fit himself. (This was another of the problems with the X
Type – the harness had to be adjusted to fit each individual, unlike the PT10 or SAVIAC parachutes which had easy adjusting straps). 

After many hours of preparation, we did what most warriors do, given the opportunity – we went to the various messes to swallow a few beers. It was hard to sleep on the mats in the PTS hangar with soldiers tripping over each other during the night.

Early next morning the lights in the hangar were turned on and everybody was given a briefing on Operation Mackerel. “Take Off” time was 0725hrs and flight
time to the DZ was about 30 minutes. We didn’t do any ground training before the drop -at later times; this became mandatory.

We were all nervous – it was the first true test of what we’d learned, and everyone was anxious to prove themselves -a number of troops came up and said “Please Sarge don’t let me hesitate, just give me a big push .”  “Don’t worry,” I said “You’ll be fine.” And, as always, they were.
 In fact it would have been nearly impossible to stop the stick exiting once it started to go out of the door, especially if one of the old soldiers was at the end pushing.

On September 26, 1962, also on Operation Mackerel, we dropped two sticks of seven and one stick of six at Chingagwe in the Inyanga area. The pilot for this operational drop was Flt/Lt Alexander, and as we only had one para Dakota it was #704 again. This time I didn’t do the DZ recce. Sergeant Jock Hutton, one of the old soldiers who’d jumped at Normandy on “D” day, got stuck up a very tall pine tree. Because of the X type parachute, he had great difficulty getting down. However, he did manage to get to his water bottle and, like all old soldiers, especially those of a Scots’ ancestry, he’d filled it with just a wee dram or two.  He would’ve been happy to stay up the tree for a little longer if there wasn’t a war to fight.

What war? This was supposed to be an operational jump and nothing happened. Jock getting stuck in the tree was the most exciting part of it. Not a single shot was fired in anger, and as far as the PJIs were concerned, it was a fizzer.

The notable thing about this whole episode was the amount of time it took for the paratroopers to get ready with a weapon in a suspended load, which could be 15 feet away from him when most needed. It was only about 17 years after the end of the Second World War, and apart from the inclusion of a reserve parachute, very little thought had been given to the improvement of equipment. The main parachute was still the 28-foot diameter X type, and weapons were still carried as a suspended load, which took far too long to get out of the pack. There had to be a better way of doing things. But, as usual in any military organization, it takes time for improvements and cost was always a priority.

The Royal Rhodesian Air Force was responsible for the supply, maintenance and repacking of all military parachutes, and we only had 100 static line X type parachutes available to us for both training and operations. The result was that the parachutes used on Op Mackerel had to be picked up and returned to the Safety Equipment Section ASAP, so we could continue training.

We did another drop on Op Mackerel on October 3, 1962, when we dropped two sticks of ten at Dombashawa. This time the pilot was Flt/lt Johnson and again it was from Dakota #704. Between these so called operational jumps, the staff at PTS was trying to train basic course #11. With reference to my log book, #11 Basic did their first jump out of  Dakota 704 on September 25, 1962, their second on the 26th, third and fourth on the 28th, fifth on the 29th, sixth on October 2, and seventh and eighth on October 4. With only 100 X Type parachutes available, we kept the parachute packers very busy.

More operational jumps took place for Operation Gwebi's Gambol . On 11th Oct 1962 I did the DZ reconnaissance  from an  Alouette III Helicopter flown by Flt/Lt Rex Taylor of #7 Sqn. Things were improving with regards to the clandestine deployment of  Paratroops. At the very least we were now checking the DZ  from the air a couple of days prior to the actual drop.  This time I did not have to drive to the spot then walk all over the place to check the landing area, or sign my life away to get the necessary equipment for the reconnaissance.

 On October 13, we dropped two sticks of 20 out of Dakota #705 (704 must have been having a service) for Operation Gwebi’s  Gambol.

 Between September 22 and October 20, 1962, over 300 jumps took place. Of these, 120 were operational jumps with the remainder being Basic Course #11. The PJIs jumped at every opportunity, as always.

In the Safety Equipment Section at that time there were only three packing tables. It took the average packer 20 minutes to pack an X type parachute. It took us only 1.5 seconds to unpack it. Assuming they were working for eight hours a day, they produced approximately 24 parachutes per table, giving us a total of 72 parachutes per day. This was truly a magnificent effort from only about six or seven men. As well as packing our static line parachutes they had to repair any damage and were
also required to service ejection seats and all other aircraft safety equipment. Additionally, the reserve parachutes and dispatchers’ parachutes had to be repacked every two months. In all my years at the Parachute Training School there was not a single packing error - an incredible record.

The STANDING ORDERS FOR THE PARACHUTE TRAINING SCHOOL stated. It is the responsibility of the staff  to ensure the safe arrival of all parachute troops onto the selected Drop Zones. The PTS staff  are required to develop techniques and  the necessary training of parachute troops to ensure the minimum injury rate possible at all times during training and operations. PTS took these orders very seriously and all military parachute descents in the Rhodesian Bush War were approved by the PJI's on the Fire Forces. This resulted in the lowest injury rate in the world for operational parachute drops.






This photograph was taken from the last seat on the port side of the Dakota and shows a soldier jumping with a suspended load and using an X Type parachute. The suspension hooks and the jettison device attached to the parachute harness leg strap can easily be seen. This is a training jump from 1000ft AGL.