CHAPTER 7 THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

  

On November 11 1965, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith made the now famous Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Suddenly, the Parachute Training School hangar was filled with soldiers, armed with all manner of weapons, including Saracen Armoured Cars, rocket launchers, mortars, and even some Vickers machine guns. Some thought the British might smite this bunch of rowdy up-start rebels. Nothing happened, and, after a short period of excitement, things returned to normal. I remember, the Saracen Armoured Cars were armed with a 37mm main gun, but we only had 3 rounds of ammunition for them. I went for a hair raising ride in one of these cars which drove at speed straight into a fair sized Masasa  tree. This resulted in having a lot of branches wrapped around the front of the car and the young Subaltern yelling over the roar of the engine "See, Instant camouflage". As far as I was concerned they were crazy.

In December 1965 we trained SAS basic course #19, and the PJIs managed to prevent their training skills from becoming stale. However, something new was starting to happen. Along with the political changes, systems and attitudes within the Armed Forces changed too. We finally began to break free from the restraints imposed upon us by the British system and started to develop our own techniques and to challenge the assumptions we’d inherited from the old RAF system.

 It was during this time that a great portion of the RAF Parachuting Manual was thrown in the bin. One of the problems of the British system was the Airforce trained the Army to parachute but they were unaware of, and failed to assess, the soldiers' needs after landing. For example, where was his weapon? Was it easy to collapse his parachute canopy if there was a ground wind? How hard was it to get down from a tree if he landed up one? How hard was it to collect all the parachutists together after the parachute descent especially at night?

These were just some of the problems which were addressed by the Royal Rhodesian Air Force Parachute  Training School. None of which had been discussed by the Royal Air Force Parachute Training School when we did our PJI training at Abingdon. The reason for this was because the RAF PJI's were not trained as soldiers. They only thought as airmen. As long as the soldiers arrived on the correct drop zone in one piece the Air Force job was done.

But amongst the Rhodesian PJIs, some of us were airmen, some were soldiers, and Trevor Smith had been a British South Africa Policeman who had been taught how to ride and look after horses. Bill Maitland was an Aircraft  woodworker who had served with the British Parachute Regiment in Palestine and Frank Hales had served with the Royal Artillery in Korea and the SAS in Borneo. This gave our small staff a very wide range of experience - we could, and did think like soldiers,  and brain storming sessions were always entertaining.

For example, up to this point it was a definite no-no to jump into trees. The RAF at Abingdon had told us, repeatedly, it was dangerous, and to be avoided at all costs. Sure, with an X type parachute it could pose a problem if the parachutist was hung up and had to get out of the harness before he could climb down. But the average height of the trees in the Rhodesian bush was only about eight meters or less, and if someone got hooked up he would only end up a meter or so off the ground.

During my childhood, my brothers and I would take great delight in hurtling down the steep driveway on tricycles straight into the bushes at the end. We never sustained any injuries except for a few scratches and in fact, the springy foliage cushioned the fall. On a larger scale, the SAS had jumped into trees in the Malayan jungle – and even had an abseiling device for lowering paratroopers down from very high trees

Up to this time, the only occasions when a parachutist was stuck up a tree had been accidental, and no injury was recorded.  Once I landed on top of one of the pine trees which surrounded the sports fields at New Sarum and the only comment in my log book was “PHEW!!”  It was a problem recovering the parachute, but otherwise no big deal and I was at the very top of the tree clutching the thin bit with the canopy draped around me. I was more concerned with getting down, because the outside of the pine tree looked like a smooth green slide, but not meant for sliding  This happened a few times without any ill effects - apart from retrieving the parachute. Thorn trees could have been painful but I don't recall anybody landing on one.

So it was not the trees that were the problem, but the X type parachute and its antiquated harness. If you were stuck up a tree on the end of this parachute you had no choice but to get out of the harness to climb down. However once we were re-equipped with the SAVIAC copy of the American PT10 Parachute  this was not an issue because these parachutes were fitted with the Capewell canopy release system. This system allowed the parachutist to easily disconnect the parachute canopy from the harness to climb or drop down. Despite what the RAF told us, provided the correct tree landing technique was used there was very little chance of injury.

Another change we made was, we no longer used a DZ (drop-zone) safety officer for trained paratroops on exercises away from home base. A PJI was responsible for the drop, and this could be done from inside the aircraft. DZ’s could easily be selected by careful observation of the area from a helicopter or fixed wing aircraft, or from the Dakota doing the drop. All that was required was  a good look at the ground and the best spot selected. Trees were no longer considered a hazard. In fact, as they offered concealment, they could be used to the paratroopers’ advantage.

Good DZ selection was perfected through on the job training. On one occasion, I jumped onto a ploughed field which looked good from the air, but when I hit the ground I found the clods of earth were large and it was like hitting very hard boulders the size of footballs. The lesson learned was “Do not assume ploughed fields are good DZs” – they are only good if they have been harrowed or it has recently rained a decent amount.

Jumping into a mature maize field was also not a good place to land because the corn in Rhodesia was often over 3mts high and parachute recovery was extra difficult. It was also hard to advance toward the terrorist position and difficult to see the rest of your stick  through the thick corn stalks.

 I learned the hard way another place to avoid was an area the African peasant farmer had cleared for planting. This became evident as I was coming in to land. The farmer had chopped down all the trees he wanted to remove but left a large number of waist high stumps for me to crash into. Something I only discovered when about 10 meters up and coming in to land with nowhere else to go. I can think of only one or two worse sights -  someone under you with a spear pointing up, or having to land astride a barbed wire fence. We found it was often a simple matter of moving a short distance away for the troops to land safely. On most occasions this was less than 100mts.

We also found drifters, (the first paratrooper out who tests wind speed and drift) were not a necessity, and in a combat situation definitely would not be used. With the use of a smoke grenade, or simply observing the trees and grass in the area, a competent person could get a good indication of wind direction and – to a lesser degree – wind speed. Thus the distance to be laid off up wind, could be judged reasonably accurately. The helicopter could give the Dakota crew the necessary information for altimeter setting so an accurate drop height could be guaranteed.

 Until the early 1970's the drop height was still 1000 feet AGL as per RAF rules.  We lowered the drop height to between 400 and 500 ft and this greatly improved accuracy because the paratroops would not drift as far. All Fire Force drops were supposed to be done from 500ft AGL however in the heat of battle this could be lower or higher from time to time.

The only hazard to a successful parachute drop was, and still is, high ground wind speed. As long as the ground wind was below 15 knots, the injury rate was kept to a reasonably low level. We found that if any troops were dropped in winds exceeding 15 knots injuries would be sustained no matter how experienced they were. The ridiculous result: more injuries, and consequently more casualty evacuations, would be caused by parachuting than by the enemy.

Ground training by the PJIs was essential on a continuous basis to keep the injury rate very low. This was borne out later in the Fire-Force role when thousands of jumps took place every year and very low injury rates were maintained. Also, before any troops were ever tasked to carry out a new type of parachute descent, eg into trees, rocky ground, ploughed fields, static line drops from 400ft or HALO drops well above 20,000ft AGL, it was always tried out by the PJIs first. We were the experts and the crash test dummies - if we couldn’t do it, the troops definitely could not.

As we were no longer restricted to the RAF methods, we were happy to take ideas from around the world. For example, we had access to a number of training films one of which was about the American way of training paratroops. It showed  us they used the over head cable in the C47 Dakota for their static line parachute deployment. The RAF way was to use a cable down the starboard side and a 15ft long strop to deploy the parachute. This made the aircraft drill complicated and required greater maintenance because the strops had to be folded in a special way. We inherited this system and because it worked it was not deemed prudent to change it. However, because the Americans used the overhead cable to deploy PT10 parachutes we felt safe in doing it as well. All the staff at PTS jumped with this parachute and we brainstormed various methods to make the aircraft drill simple.

This photograph clearly shows a stick of paratroopers using X Type parachutes whilst jumping from a Dakota aircraft. On the man nearest the door is the strop and hook attached to the static line D ring. This is beginning to pull the parachute pack open. The rigging lines of the middle man in the stick have begun to deploy. The first man in the stick's parachute canopy is starting to inflate. Total time for all three men to jump is less than a second and a half.

Always aware of the soldiers' needs after he landed, we also worked to improve ways to carry rifles and MAG's. One improvement we  did adopt from the RAF was the CSPEP (carrying straps personal equipment parachutist) which was better than the old W.W.2 PWC ( parachute weapons container).

This photograph shows a Rhodesian African Rifles paratrooper  with his MAG (M60 to some) secured to his body with the body band of his parachute. Notice he has a 50 round belt of ammunition wrapped around the breach of the gun. On close inspection the rigging line tie can be seen tied around the trigger guard of the weapon, it would be going under the parachute lift webs and held in place by the reserve parachute on the left side of the harness. A parachute recovery bag can be seen dangling around this soldiers knees it is hanging from a leg strap. The rest of the stick can be seen waiting in the shade under the wing of the Dakota. A close look at the aircraft engine shows the anti Strella exhaust shroud. The Strella was an  anti aircraft heat seeking  missile used by the terrorists. No Dakota's were shot down by them.

We found that with the PT 10 parachute harness, a rifle or the MAG could be carried by the parachutist, secured to his body by the parachute body band. A piece of parachute rigging line was secured to the butt of the weapon and passed under the parachute lift webs, around his back, to the reserve D ring on the opposite side of his body. On landing the parachutist only had to unclip his reserve, pull the body band quick release and his weapon could be used. If necessary he could operate his Capewells and join the battle with the parachute harness still on.

For the Parachute Training School UDI promoted thinking outside of the box. Equipment and supplies were difficult to get due to sanctions, and parachuting information was almost impossible to obtain. But because of this we became innovators, inventors and developers of better military parachuting techniques.