CHAPTER 31 OPERATION GATLING: REVENGE FOR THE VISCOUNT AIRLINE DISASTER

Only in Rhodesia would a paratrooper qualify for his wings with an operational jump, into action, deep in a hostile country. Only in Rhodesia would troops be forced to scrounge, beg and borrow equipment for a major military operation. Only in Rhodesia would we send a few hundred paratroops to attack over 4000 enemy in camps hundreds of kilometres apart, not once, but twice in one day. But desperate times call for desperate measures. And we were desperately seeking revenge.

On 3^rd September 1978 at 17h10 a civilian Viscount Airliner took off from Kariba Airport and headed for Salisbury. There were 58 civilian passengers and crew on board, mostly holiday makers. Approximately 5 mins after take-off, and just as the Captain turned onto the heading for Salisbury, a SAM 7 heat seeking missile struck the inner starboard turbo prop engine. The pilot, Captain John Hood, immediately put out a Mayday radio call and, fighting for control, managed to put the stricken Viscount into a shallow dive. The starboard wing was on fire and the captain had no choice but to crash land.

As the aircraft approached the ground Captain Hood saw a clearing ahead and, with great skill, managed to land his plane there. Unfortunately there was a large ditch across it and the Viscount broke up on impact. 18 passengers in the tail section, some severely injured, survived the crash and made their way clear of the wreckage.

The Rhodesian Air Force immediately sent out search and rescue aircraft to the area, but it was not until the next morning the wreckage was found by a Dakota with SAS paratroopers on board. The skipper, Flt/Lt Nick Mehmel, a reserve pilot, dropped the paratroopers onto the smouldering wreckage.

As the SAS floated down they saw a group of bodies who’d clearly escaped the crash. They were horrified to discover these survivors were murdered - killed by the group of terrorists who’d shot down the plane. Three survivors escaped when the terrorists opened fire, by running into the bush, and five others, who’d gone to seek help, remained hidden.

Of the 18 people who survived the shooting down of what was clearly a civilian passenger aircraft, 10 had been murdered. Two of these were little girls aged 11 and 4. The terrorist gang involved in this outrageous massacre were from the ZIPRA faction lead by Joshua Nkomo, and had crossed into Rhodesia from Zambia.

There was a deafening silence from the rest of the world, not a single country apart from the Republic of South Africa, uttered one word of condemnation. This left a bitter and angry Rhodesia little choice – revenge and retribution was the only option.

We had to teach them a real lesson, as the RLI said, “Let’s cull the bastards.”  Our desire for action was fueled by the blatant bragging to the International press, of ZIPRA leader, Joshua Nkomo. He happily claimed responsibility for shooting down the plane, but then plead ignorance over the murder of the survivors. We were determined to hit back hard and annihilate the animals who slaughtered innocent children.

The above map shows the start points (in black) for the attacks on the terrorist bases in Zambia. The black arrow with the #1 was the New Sarum Air Base from which the Canberra B2 bombers laid waste to the FC Terrorist camp, red arrow #1, and also took control of Zambian air space. New Sarum was also the start point for the vertical envelopment of the Terrorist camp at Mkushi red arrow #2. The DC7F also started from New Sarum and their drop of men, fuel drums and ammunition into the Admin base situated only a 5 to 6 min chopper flight south of  the Mkushi camp. The last terrorist camp to be hit was the CGT 2 (Communist Guerrilla Training 2 ) at red arrow 3 and the start point for the RLI paratroopers who vertically enveloped this target was  FAF2 at Kariba airfield, black arrow 2. Black arrow 3 at Mana Pools was the start point for the helicopter borne SAS attack on the Mkushi camp red arrow 2 and also for the RLI helicopter men who hit CGT2 red arrow 3. The helicopter gun ships (K car) also attacked all 3 targets and their start point was also from black arrow 3. I believe hundreds of terrorists and maybe thousands were killed in these attacks. Unfortunately one SAS trooper was killed at Mkushi, where a bushfire also destroyed some of our parachutes. The attack on CGT2 was a lemon and the RLI found that most of the terrorists had wisely departed in a hurry. 


And, on 19^th October 1978 we took revenge in a massive way. We hit three separate camps, deep inside Zambia, where the terrorists thought they were safe.  The first strike was on the main terrorist base known as Freedom Camp (FC), 15kms outside Lusaka the Zambian capital. It contained 4000 terrorists under training, as well as the ZIPRA military high command. This attack was a pure airstrike involving Hunter FB9, Canberra B2 and Alouette III K car gunships and it struck at 08.30hrs when the terrorists were on parade. In this famous attack Green Leader, Canberra Bomber Section leader, Sqn/Ldr Chris Dixon, took control of Zambian Airspace, thousands of terrorists were culled and a Rhodesian icon was born.

The second attack was a vertical envelopment of Mkushi Camp, conducted by the SAS, and took place immediately after the attack on FC Camp. 125 kilometres North East of Lusaka, this camp contained approximately 1000 terrorists. They knew they were in for a beating when the massive explosions, delivered by the Hunters and Canberra B2 Bombers, enveloped them.

Ground shaking explosions were followed by the devastating chatter of cannon fire from the Allouette III helicopter gunships. Then, as the remaining terrorists began to run for it, they were confronted by our men, floating down by parachute. They knew their time had come.

This photograph shows that every SAS soldier was used on these raids. It would have been nearly impossible to stop Sgt Major Jock Hutt0n from jumping on this operation. He is seen here in his usual relaxed manner waiting to be checked by the PJI  dispatchers and wearing his combat cap. His stories about his jump into Normandy on D day WW2 were always very amusing especially when told in his broad Scots accent. 

Paratroops were also dropped onto an Admin Base close to the Mkushi camp to ready the helicopter fuel and ammunition dropped by a DC7. This drop was onto what appeared to be nice, open, grass- land and indeed it was. But there was a snag - it was covered in what is known as Buffalo Beans, a creeper which grows beans covered in fine hairs which pierce the skin and cause very painful itching. The only way to prevent the extremely uncomfortable scratching is to plaster the affected area with mud. Once it dries it can be peeled off to remove the hairs with it. These guys cursed us mightily for the DZ selection. (So did the parachute packers, who, after the chutes were returned, had to deal with an unexpected shower of Buffalo Beans as they checked and repacked them. (We were very unpopular for a long time over this.)

 The troops who jumped into this admin base included the retired RSM of the SAS, Stan Standish, who had somehow managed to wangle his way onto this operation. In his late 60s at the time, Stan was the oldest person to carry out an operational parachute jump in Rhodesia, and probably the world. He had jumped at Arnhem during WW2, over 30 years before. When asked if there was anyone older he replied, “Only the Bloody Aircraft.” Every member of the SAS was used on this attack, every plane was used and every PJI was also called up. Stan, the legend, was certainly not going to miss out!

The third attack was also a vertical envelopment, this time of the CGT2 complex (Communist Guerrilla Training) approximately 100 kilometres South East of Lusaka. This complex also housed many thousands of terrorists.

This time the approximately 168 paratroopers were drawn from the RLI. 60 of these were on a Basic RLI static line course going through the Parachute Training School at the time. Immediately after their 7^th jump (the night jump) they were to return to barracks to ready for their qualifying wings jump the next morning. Instead the trucks turned off and they found themselves at the SAS Kabrit Barracks where they were quarantined.

It was here they were told their final qualifying jump would not exactly be standard. They would only get their wings after they had completed an operational jump. Into action. Deep in hostile territory. They were truly going to earn their wings!

 Next day these men returned to PTS, drew their full battle loads, and found a large amount of additional equipment, including extra MAG belted 7.62 mm ammunition, RPG 7 rocket launchers 60mm mortars and bombs, and extra A63 radios and batteries. This meant almost every paratrooper was carrying a suspended load which was not usual in the Fire Force Role.

Unlike the SAS, the RLI did not have the equipment to make up the suspended loads. The RLI had not thought about the CSPEP (carrying straps personal equipment parachutist). Or jettison devices. Or suspension ropes. Or suspension hooks.

These troops learned to jump with loads using the training equipment provided by PTS. They knew how to use it and had used it, but now, it appeared, there was none available from their own resources. Only the SAS had this equipment and they were fully committed to the attack on Mkushi. In the end, the RLI used the training equipment from PTS.

The RLI collected their equipment and were taken up to the PTS hangar where they found the usual incredibly detailed models of the targets. They were also informed that this attack was the final of three and would only take place after the other two had been hit.

This meant one of three possible scenarios would greet them; the enemy might be forewarned because of the two previous attacks and abandon the complex; they could be forewarned but stand and fight, which could make the day a very messy affair; or they could be totally ignorant of the previous attacks and get a serious surprise. Obviously we were hoping for the third option.

 The RLI were positioned at FAF2 Kariba for their start point. As soon as the briefing was over these 160-ish RLI, including the 60 not yet qualified paratroopers, went to Safety Equipment Section and drew their parachutes. They packed their kit into the suspended loads and the PJIs distributed our CSPEPS amongst them. Then more problems emerged - there just was not enough equipment to go around.

 I hurried down to Safety Equipment Section where rolls of webbing were used to repair parachute harnesses and seat belts. There was also a supply of knurled buckles from the original weapons containers we had discarded many years before. In Rhodesia, during these times absolutely nothing was thrown away, and we were the masters of recycling. Also available were D rings. All these items could be attached to the webbing with heavy duty sewing machines in the repair shop. There was light grade canvas material and some sensible fellows had their ponchos. By sewing two lengths of webbing together in the form of a cross then placing a piece of canvas or a poncho over the webbing and piling all the kit into the middle we were able to tie this up like a parcel. This now became a suspended load. Not the best, not the safest, but under the circumstances it was all we could do.

However this was not the end of the troubles. We didn’t have enough suspension ropes or jettison devices, and we were also short of quick release hooks. Normally when a paratrooper jumped with a suspended load it was attached to the two lower D rings on the parachute harness with two quick release hooks. After the parachute deployed, the levers on the quick release hooks operated, permitting the load to drop to the end of the suspension rope. The rope was fitted with a jettison device in case of a parachute malfunction. If the paratrooper jettisoned his load he would be useless in the forthcoming battle because his equipment would be smashed.

I decided no paratrooper jumping on this operation was to jettison his equipment.  Result, we did not need a jettison device, only a piece of suitable rope about 5mt long, one end tied to the bundle and the other to the parachute harness.

When they jumped, all soldiers would carry their personal weapon attached to their body with a fully loaded magazine on the rifle or with a 50 round belt fitted to the MAG – ready to use immediately. They would also have their usual webbing under the parachute harness with the usual allocation of water bottles, grenades, ten full rifle magazines and wound dressing etc.

 For a few years PTS had tried out various, locally made items of equipment. One such item was rope for the replacement of the suspension rope we normally used,

which could only be obtained outside the country. However, all the ropes we tested broke when we dropped loads from the fan platform in the PTS hangar and the salesman was sent on his way.

Now, all of a sudden the smelly stuff was hitting the fan, we needed rope, lots of it. I visited Safety Equipment Section and obtained a roll of parachute rigging line with a supposed breaking strain of 500lbs. Perhaps if doubled up it would be OK. For the quick release hooks we had only one option, instead of two hooks per paratrooper with a suspended load, they would have one and would just have to hang onto their loads until after parachute deployment. This was what was known as an operational necessity.

I’d just fitted my own weapon and parachute when the commander of the Air Force personally came to ask how it was going. Although we’d been doing it for years, this was the only time this particular Commander ever bothered to see us off. We were about to dispatch over 300 paratroopers onto two different targets and an admin base and we did not have the correct gear. How the hell did he think I was going?

 I let him have it with both barrels. What we were doing, even with all the necessaries, was ambitious and risky - without the proper equipment it was, to put it mildly, fucking dangerous. There was a good chance some of these teenage soldiers would be killed due simply to equipment failure. Just maybe we were doing one jump too many. I stomped off and joined my stick. Not the way to win friends or to gain promotion.

As it turned out not a single parachuting injury occurred on this operation and after the battles were over PTS got almost all its equipment back. This was testimony to the training the troops received and their discipline under the most stressful circumstances.

The operational plan called for Dakotas to fly the RLI into FAF2 at Kariba early the following morning. The planes would then return to New Sarum, pick up the SAS, drop them onto the Mkushi complex, return to FAF2 Kariba as soon as possible, pick up the RLI and drop them onto CGT2 camp. In the mean- time the Hunters and Canberras were re-armed for their third strike and would hit this camp in the usual way, just before the parachutists dropped. We did not have many aircraft or many PJIs – every single one was used on each of the three attacks so this was also a highly structured, and for all involved highly exhausting, logistical operation.

Another 48 RLI troops were dropped by Alouette III helicopters from their forward base at Mana Pools, just south of the Zambezi. There were also 4 Allouette K car gunships. The ground commander was in one to control the battle as was usual in a Fire Force type strike. In addition to the K car gunships there were Vampire and Lynx aircraft available overhead for heavy ground support if required.

 After the drop onto Mkushi terrorist base camp, the Dakotas flew at very low level back to Rhodesia and crossed the Zambezi River to land at the FAF2, where the RLI waited already kitted up. The Dakotas re-fueled and immediately loaded the RLI paratroopers. Before climbing aboard I gave them the Gypsy’s warning about refusing to jump.

Then we were airborne again heading into a very hostile Zambia. The Skipper was Flt/Lt Rodwell the youngest Volunteer Reserve Dakota Captain.

Immediately after the drop on CGT2 camp the Dakotas returned to FAF2 base where they were refuelled and given the once over by the techs. The FAF commander organised a magnificent spread and it was only then I realised I’d only drunk coffee for the last 24hrs and most of my PJIs were in the same boat. Tony Hughes piled his plate up with cold meats and salads and topped it off with a scoop of ice cream. He just wanted food and did not care in what order it arrived in his stomach.

 But our day was not yet over. We loaded a Dakota with 200ltr drums of helicopter fuel and fitted them with parachutes in case they were needed. Sometime around 4pm that afternoon, as the paratroopers were  withdrawn by helicopter, the call for fuel came into the FAF2 Ops room and the Dakota, with the drums on board, flew off with a couple of PJI s on board to shove them out the door.

 The reason for the PJIs doing this was because 3 Air Supply Platoon were fully committed with the DC7 dropping stuff into the Admin Base.  A couple of the U/T PJIs provided the muscle with a qualified PJI in command for this task, and they had a very exciting trip. On their way back they were hazed by a Zambian training jet of Russian make. The Dakota headed for the trees and flew very low. Fortunately this Jet decided discretion was the better part of valour when faced with a Hunter FB9 carrying side-winder air to air missiles.

After the attack most of the parachutes were recovered as well as the CSPEP equipment belonging to PTS. In fact, whenever we carried out these raids, nearly all of the parachuting equipment was recovered. This was due to the dedication and care of the young soldiers who’d jumped and was a significant bonus for a country affected by sanctions.

Operation Gatling was an outstanding success despite the shortage of equipment. The air strike on the FC camp killed thousands of terrorists and wounded many more. The vertical envelopment of Mkushi camp also resulted in many hundreds of terrorists killed, including many armed and camouflaged women. This camp was totally destroyed. The third attack on the CTG2 complex yielded only about fifty

terrorists because the bulk of the terrorists had wisely abandoned the place. Both camps attacked by paratroopers were ambushed over- night. The next morning the SAS were confronted by the Zambian Army accompanied by ZIPRA terrorists, and in the fire fight that ensued, the enemy were obliterated without loss to the SAS.  

As soon as the Dakota doing the resupply drop returned, I looked for a place to put my head down. I had spent over 11 hours 30 minutes in the back of a Dakota and, before this, many hours planning and preparing. I, like all involved, was mentally and physically wrecked. But adrenalin was still high and this was not about to happen. Especially when the Army Intelligence officer convinced us it would be splendid to visit the casino and give the local population a morale boost.

By this time news of this successful operation had hit the news – thousands of terrorists killed, their bases annihilated and all without a single loss on our side. Needless to say, at the casino we were treated like celebrities and given free drinks for the rest of the night.

My host for the night was a territorial officer who was well known at the casino, and an expert at roulette. I did not know how to play, but borrowed $10 from one of the guards at FAF2. After watching my expert, I placed a few bets and won. I put the $10 worth of chips I’d borrowed into my boot top and played with the chips I’d just won. In the end I won a substantial amount of money which was all spent the next day on a party with the RLI, especially for the young, newly qualified paratroopers.

As it turns out, this is how the entire operation went – we took a gamble with the few bits and pieces of equipment we managed to scrounge together, and won big. But it was not such a great risk because we were relying on well-trained, very determined, and very brave men who had a massive thirst for revenge. We were always going to win this one.