Until the advent of the Parachuting Fire Force, the standard Fire Force
consisted of four Alouette III helicopters. Three were called G cars, and
carried four soldiers each to the contact area. Other soldiers and helicopter
fuel would be sent towards the contact area by road in order to reduce the
distance needed should extra troops or fuel be required. These were called the
land tail.
The G cars were armed with twin 303 Browning machine guns fired by the
Technician/Crew Chief. The remaining
Alouette III helicopter was the gunship, or K car. It was armed with a 20mm
Matra MG 151 Cannon, also fired by the helicopter Technician/Crew Chief. It
also carried the ground forces commander and provided him with an aerial view
of the battle, which he could direct from above. The ground forces were
supported by a light ground attack aircraft such as the Lynx; a Reims-Cessna
FTB 337G armed with two .303 Browning machine guns, rocket pods and frantan
napalm bombs. Also available to the Fire Forces were Hunter FGA 9 jet fighters,
Canberra Bombers and, at a push, Vampire jet fighters. The air element of the
Fire Force was controlled by the K car pilot, who was the senior pilot of the
Fire Force.
In the early phase of the terrorist incursions, when the groups were
small in number, perhaps only six or seven, a few soldiers, correctly deployed,
could account for them - especially when the soldiers could call for air
support. The main idea was to surround and kill the bastards. In the Vietnam
conflict the Americans called it Vertical Envelopment, but they only used
helicopters.
In Rhodesia, troops were deployed in sticks of four men – three riflemen
and a MAG (M60) gunner. The stick leader carried a radio to communicate, not
only with other sticks on the ground, but also with the aircraft overhead. This
ability to talk with the ground force commander in the K car as well as the air
commander contributed greatly to the success of Fire Force.
In the Rhodesian Bush War, the Army (Brown Jobs), and the Air Force
(Blue Jobs), were always able to talk to each other, and on the Fire Force
bases they lived together and got to know each other.
From early 1976, the terrorist groups got larger, and when attacked
could escape by slipping through the perimeter formed by the limited number of
helicopters available.
More troops were needed to prevent the enemy from escaping Using
additional helicopters was out of the question, but paratroopers could work, as
proven on the few occasions when the SAS were dropped with excellent results.
But the only paratroopers we had were the SAS and Selous Scouts, who were
better utilised in special forces duties. So now it was time to parachute train
the regular units of the Rhodesian Army – the RLI and the RAR–.
The Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) was an all-white unit formed in 1961
during the time of Federation. Of battalion strength, it was a regular unit of
the Federal Army, and, when Federation broke apart, was absorbed into the
Rhodesian army.
The Rhodesian African Rifles, (RAR), was first formed in 1916 and was
the oldest regiment in the Rhodesian Army. At the end of WW1 it was disbanded
but reformed in 1940 and saw service in Burma. It returned to Rhodesia in 1946
and again disbanded.
Reformed for the second time in 1953, the 1st Bn RAR was sent
to assist Britain during the Malayan crisis and, after the break-up of
Federation, was also absorbed into the Rhodesian Army.
From its inception in 1916, until 1979, the RAR was exclusively
white-officered with black soldiers and NCOs. In 1973 a second battalion was
raised and barracked at Fort Victoria (now Masvingo). From 1977 as the war
intensified, it was evident that more paratoopers were needed and eventually
almost the entire Rhodesian Army was trained.
Up until November 1976, only Rhodesian special forces, the SAS and the
Selous Scouts received parachute training, and this form of transport was
mainly used for clandestine operations, outside our borders.
Within our borders, the Bush War was fought by the young men of the
Rhodesian Light Infantry and Rhodesian African Rifles. In addition to these
regular soldiers there was also the Territorial Army and the B.S.A. Police
and Police Reserve but these
units were not parachute trained. On a few occasions, the SAS were used in the
paratrooper role to assist the RLI or RAR, when large numbers of terrorists
were located.
In order to train more troops we needed more PJIs, more parachute
packers, and a few thousand more parachutes.
The PTS had carried out exercises and operations for years with the SAS,
and, in anticipation of having to use static line paratroops to surround enemy
groups on the ground, I’d devised a basic standard operating procedure:
paratroops should never be dropped closer than 1000 metres from the enemy.
Anything closer, would provide the enemy a good chance of escape as they could
run underneath the stick as they floated down from above. When the shooting
started the ters could break any Olympic speed records and the 4minute mile was
broken with ease. This would put the enemy both behind and in
front of the troopers, not ideal. The drop height was 500 feet AGL. At a push,
it was lowered to 400 feet, but never any lower as there may have been
insufficient height for the parachute to deploy properly; trees were not a
problem, as long as they were not too high or too thorny; as usual, high ground
winds were avoided And finally, the PJI had complete control of the jump and
his instructions were law.
The first RLI troops arrived at PTS in November 1976, from 1 Commando. They
were a pleasure to teach; keen to prove they were as good as the supers (SAS).
They were young, fit men who’d seen combat with the Fire Forces; the PTS were
just showing them a different way to get into action. As always, everybody who came to the
parachute training school was a volunteer and had the option of pulling out at
any time until they completed their final jump. After that, there was no
turning back and severe penalties applied for refusing to jump at any time
after receiving their wings. This did
not occur during my time at PTS.
Soon
after the first RLI static line paratroops were trained, they were deployed to
the Fire Force at Mount Darwin complete with a Dakota and crew. Now there was a
whole new ball game within the Parachute Training School. Not only were we
training the two special forces regiments, but also the RLI and two battalions
of RAR with a third RAR battalion to follow in 1977. More PJIs were needed, as
quickly as possible; not only
for the training of new paratroopers but to man the Fire Forces in the bush.
There was also an escalation in special operations, and all seemed to require
HALO drops far across the borders
The solution was to ask the
South Africans to help train Static Line paratroops. This was agreed to, and
the RLI sent their commandos to the Parachute Training School at Tempe,
Bloemfontein. Kevin Milligan went down
with the first batch and devised a four jump Fire Force orientation course on
his return to ensure all men jumping from Rhodesian Air Force Dakota’s did
exactly the same drills. Once back in Rhodesia, South African trained troops
did four jumps at 500 feet, carrying Fire Force gear, into a bush DZ, situated
close to New Sarum. These men were then ready for Fire Force, and invariably
their next jump would be into action.
Fortunately, the South
Africans had a similar training regime to our own, and we meshed very well. The
original South African PJI’s were also trained by the RAF at Abingdon. The
major difference was their failure to have the rifle or MAG attached to the
body which they carried in a suspended load instead. The South Africans still
used the side cable as we had done with the X type even though they were now
using the SAVIAC parachute which deployed with the overhead cables. The South
Africans also allowed clapping, feet stamping and yelling during take-off to
encourage the troops. We stopped this, because if things went pear shaped on
takeoff the PJI needed to be heard.
This photograph shows the first Rhodesian Light Infantry soldiers to be trained at the South African Parachute Training School at Tempe Bloemfontein. The South Africans were able to take 60 RLI at a time and we were training 60 RAR at a time plus courses of 8 doing HALO. When the RLI troops returned to Rhodesia we immediately converted them to our more practical method of combat parachuting and they did a 4 jump conversion course into one of our nearby bush DZ,s from 500 ft AGL.
To navigate the apartheid policy, the PTS in Rhodesia trained the indigenous soldiers of the RAR, and the South Africans trained the white soldiers of the RLI.
To navigate the apartheid policy, the PTS in Rhodesia trained the indigenous soldiers of the RAR, and the South Africans trained the white soldiers of the RLI.
The PTS was a very busy place. Often the early morning training sorties
had as many as five Dakota aircraft doing two or three lifts each to get
through the daily training programme. We dropped up to 300 troops a day during
these intensive training periods.
The word went out. We urgently needed more PJIs . I had an unlimited
number of vacancies for sergeant PJIs – and these were not acting ranks, they
were substantive, with parachute pay of 25 cents per day (about one beer in the
Sergeants’ Mess, in those days).
In response the RLI and SAS sent some of their best junior NCOs for
training as PJIs. The majority of the new PJIs were from the armed forces, but
some were civilians . With this increase in training, the UT/PJIs were able to
get through the program in a much shorter time. But at no time did the PTS ever
drop its standard, regardless of the pressure from above. The only troublesome
phase of training the RAR soldiers was the ‘Dribble Factor’ on the exits, but
provided not too many men failed this we were satisfied.
This photograph is of basic static line course #76 in about 1977. This was one of the first Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) parachute courses to be run and included the C.O and 3 Officers. This course also enabled Pete Laubuschagne seated on my right to qualify as a PJI. Seated on my left is Denis (Charlie) Buchan who was promoted to W.O. and would soon be Commissioned.
As soon as the troops completed their training they were deployed to the bush. For every Dakota used in the parachuting role, the PTS had to provide a qualified PJI and two dispatchers. Until we were able to train sufficient dispatchers we deployed two PJIs with every aircraft. This meant that the available PJIs did a three week training stint in the PTS, were deployed on Fire Force for three weeks and finally returned to do the next basic course. At the same time this was taking place, the school was also running HALO courses and carrying out HALO operations. It was a very busy time for all.
As soon as the troops completed their training they were deployed to the bush. For every Dakota used in the parachuting role, the PTS had to provide a qualified PJI and two dispatchers. Until we were able to train sufficient dispatchers we deployed two PJIs with every aircraft. This meant that the available PJIs did a three week training stint in the PTS, were deployed on Fire Force for three weeks and finally returned to do the next basic course. At the same time this was taking place, the school was also running HALO courses and carrying out HALO operations. It was a very busy time for all.
On most occasions when the PJIs were on Fire Force duties, they were
allocated the paratroops, and, depending on the situation would maintain daily
continuation parachute training. Although this seems excessive, especially
considering the troops had just finished the basic course, this constant
drilling kept the injury rate to below one per cent .
The PJI was also to ensure all parachutes were looked after. Each Fire
Force was deployed with 60 static line SAVIAC parachutes and every one issued
to a paratrooper was recorded on the jump manifest, with the soldier’s name and
the main and reserve numbers. As soon as the fire force was called out, the
manifest was handed to the Ops room at the Forward Airfield so it could be
passed on to PTS where the master log was maintained.
During
quiet periods on the various fire forces the PJI often requested permission to
carry out a training jump (or fun jump) every week. Most times this was allowed
and the PJI would use his discretion on the drop height. Some of these fun
jumps were from heights above 2000ft AGL and the troops really appreciated the
long ride under the canopy. These fun jumps gave all the soldiers involved
greater experience and Rhodesia possibly had the most experienced military
parachutists in the world.
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